|aHaving thought :|bessays in the metaphysics of mind /|cby John Haugeland.
|aCambridge, Mass. :|bHarvard University Press,|c1998.
|a390 p. ;|c25 cm.
|aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 367-378) and index.
|tToward a New Existentialism --|tMind.|g1.|tThe Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism.|g2.|tUnderstanding Natural Language.|g3.|tHume on Personal Identity --|tMatter.|g4.|tAnalog and Analog.|g5.|tWeak Supervenience.|g6.|tOntological Supervenience --|tMeaning.|g7.|tThe Intentionality All-Stars.|g8.|tRepresentational Genera.|g9.|tMind Embodied and Embedded --|tTruth.|g10.|tObjective Perception.|g11.|tPattern and Being.|g12.|tUnderstanding: Dennett and Searle.|g13.|t Truth and Rule-Following.
|aThe thirteen essays collected here are all, in one way or another, about understanding: What is it? What does it take to have it? What does it presuppose in what can be understood? In the first group of essays, under the heading Mind, the questions are more specifically about intelligence: First, how can intelligence itself be understood scientifically (as in "cognitive science"); and second, how can the scientific endeavor, so conceived, account for the possibility of a self or subject that understands? Under the second head, Matter, the focus turns to the metaphysical issues surrounding the intelligibility of the mental as a distinctive and irreducible phenomenon in a universe that is, in some sense, ultimately material. The third group of essays, Meaning, addresses the pivotal topics of representation and intentionality, with particular emphasis on the diversity of possibilities - including those that are not symbolic and not internal. The final group, headed Truth, contains the most recent essays. Here the earlier themes come together around the fundamental problem of the metaphysics of mind: What is objective knowledge, and how is it possible? The answer, broached in an exploratory way, amounts to a contemporary revival of transcendental constitution - an idea prominent in the history of philosophy, but largely absent from the recent literature.
The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. What is it? What does it take to have it? What does it presuppose in what can be understood? In the first group of essays John Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence. Intelligibility comes to the fore in a set of "metaphysical" pieces on analog and digital systems and supervenience. In the third set of papers Haugeland elaborates and then undermines a battery of common presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation. Finally, the fourth and most recent group of essays confronts the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood. The necessary interdependence between personality and intelligence is developed and explained, specifically in the conditions of the possibility of objective scientific knowledge.