|aEconomic origins of dictatorship and democracy /|cby Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson.
|aCambridge :|bCambridge University Press,|c2009.
|axv, 416 p. :|bill. ;|c23 cm.
|aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 381-399) and index.
|aQuestions and answers -- Paths of political development -- Our argument -- What do we know about democracy? -- Modeling politics -- Democratic politics -- Nondemocratic politics -- The creation and consolidation of democracy -- Democratization -- Coups and consolidation -- Putting the models to work -- The role of the middle class -- Economic structure and democracy -- Globalization and democracy -- Conclusions and the future of democracy.
|a"This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization."--Publisher description.