|aThe theory of learning in games /|cDrew Fudenberg and David K. Levine.
|aCambridge, Mass. :|bMIT Press,|cc1998.
|axiv, 276 p. :|bill. ;|c24 cm.
|aMIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution ;|v2
|aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
|g1.|tIntroduction|g2.|tFictitious Play|g3.|tReplicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models of Evolution|g4.|tStochastic Fictitious Play and Mixed Strategy Equilibria|g5.|tAdjustment Models with Persistent Randomness|g6.|tExtensive Form Games and Self confirming Equilibrium|g7.|tNash Equilibrium, Large Population Models, and Mutations in Extensive Form Games|g8.|tSophisticated Learning.