|aInstitutional design in new democracies :|bEastern Europe and Latin America /|cedited by Arend Lijphart & Carlos H. Waisman.
|aBoulder, Colo. :|bWestview Press,|cc1996.
|axvi, 265 pages :|billustrations ;|c24 cm.
|aLatin America in global perspective.
|aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
|tInstitutional design and democratization /|rArend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman --|tInitiation of new democratic institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America /|rBarbara Geddes --|tElectoral systems and electoral reform in Latin America /|rDieter Nohlen --|tProportional representation versus majoritarian systems : free elections and political parties in Poland, 1989-1991 /|rStanislaw Gebethner --|tElectoral engineering and democratic stability : the legacy of authoritarian rule in Chile /|rPeter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela.
|tExecutive-legislative relations in crisis : Poland's experience, 1989-1993 /|rJerzy J. Wiatr --|tParliamentarism in the making : crisis and political transformation in Hungary /|rGy├Ârgy Szoboszlai --|tChanging the balance of power in a hegemonic party system : the case of Mexico /|rJuan Molinar Horcasitas --|tHyperpresidentialism and constitutional reform in Argentina /|rCarlos Santiago Nino --|tPrivatization in Central Europe : can it be designed? /|r├ëva Voszka --|tObstacles to economic reform in Brazil /|rJuarez Brand├úo Lopes -- --
|tMultiple roles of privatization in Argentina /|rRoberto Frenkel and Guillermo Rozenwurcel --|tDesign of democracies and markets : generalizing across regions /|rArend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman.
Countries throughout Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are moving from semi-closed to open economies and from authoritarian to democratic political systems. Despite important differences between the regions, these transitions involve similar tasks: the establishment of governmental institutions and electoral systems conducive to legitimation of the new and fragile democracies and expansion of the institutional infrastructure of a market economy.This volume looks at both regions, focusing on the relationship between the tasks of institutional design and the outcomes of the process of economic and political liberalization. In particular, the contributors emphasize the design of institutions to serve a market economy, the design of electoral laws, and the design of executive-legislative relations. Each chapter discusses the legacy of the pre-existing authoritarian regime; the range of preferences among various strategic actors (the government, state bureaucracies, opposition parties, and interest groups) with regard to the pace and mix of reforms; and the consequences of final choices for the institutionalization of effective economies and the process of democratization.