|aReification :|ba new look at an old idea /|cAxel Honneth ; with commentaries by Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, Jonathan Lear ; edited and introduced by Martin Jay.
|aOxford ;|aNew York :|bOxford University Press,|cc2008.
|aBerkeley tanner lectures
|tIntroduction /|rMartin Jay --|tReification and Recognition: A New Look at an Old Idea /|rAxel Honneth --|tComments --|tTaking Another's View: Ambivalent Implications /|rJudith Butler --|tPhilosophical Anthropology and Social Criticism /|rRaymond Geuss --|tThe Slippery Middle /|rJonathan Lear --|tRejoinder /|rAxel Honneth.
|a"Three distinguished political and social theorists - Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, and Jonathan Lear - respond with hard questions about the central anthropological premise of Honneth's argument: the assumption that prior to cognition there is a fundamental experience of intersubjective recognition that can provide a normative standard by which current social relations can be judged wanting. Honneth listens carefully to their criticisms and provides a powerful defense of his position."--Jacket.
In the early 20th century, Marxist theory was enriched and rejuvenated by adopting the concept of reification, introduced by the Hungarian theorist Georg Lukács to identify and denounce the transformation of historical processes into ahistorical entities, human actions into things that seemed part of an immutable "second nature." For a variety of reasons, both theoretical and practical, the hopes placed in de-reification as a tool of revolutionary emancipation proved vain. In these original and imaginative essays, delivered as the Tanner Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley in 2005, the distinguished third-generation Frankfurt School philosopher Axel Honneth attempts to rescue the concept of reification by recasting it in terms of the philosophy of recognition he has been developing over the past two decades. Three distinguished political and social theorists: Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, and Jonathan Lear, respond with hard questions about the central anthropological premise of his argument, the assumption that prior to cognition there is a fundamental experience of intersubjective recognition that can provide a normative standard by which current social relations can be judged wanted. Honneth listens carefully to their criticism and provides a powerful defense of his position.