|aPerception, affectivity, and volition in Husserl's phenomenology /|cRoberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi, Roberto Rubio, editors.
|axv, 202 pages ;|c25 cm.
|aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
|tHorizonality and Legitimation in Perception, Affectivity, and Volition /|rRoberto Walton --|tPercept, Feeling, Pragma: Some Static and Genetic Connections /|rLuis Román Rabanaque --|tHusserl's Spatialization of Perceptual Consciousness /|rMichael K. Shim --|tHow Husserl's and Searle's Contextual Model Reformulates the Discussion About the Conceptual Content of Perception /|rPol Vandevelde --|t"The Most Beautiful Pearls": Speculative Thoughts on a Phenomenology of Attention (with Husserl and Goethe) /|rSebastian Luft --|tToward an A Priori Gefühlsmoral: Husserl's Criticism of Hume's Theory of Moral Sentiments /|rMariano Crespo --|tPain and Intentionality /|rSaulius Geniusas --|tHusserl's Concept of Urstiftung: From Passivity to History /|rLuis Niel --|tAnnihilation of the World?: Husserl's Rehabilitation of Reality /|rShigeru Taguchi --|tPhenomenology and the Other: Phenomenology Facing the Twenty-First Century /|rJavier San Martín.
|aThis collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl's phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be "irrational" or "pre-rational." The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl's view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly "rational" and the "irrational" as well as that of the "practical" and the "theoretical."